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THE FORK IN THE ROAD REVISITED: 
AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME 
THE CLASH BETWEEN FORMALISTIC 
AND PRAGMATIC APPROACHES  
MARKUS A. PETSCHE* 
ABSTRACT 
This article revisits one of the most controversial issues of 
international investment law, namely the question of the effect of fork-in-
the-road (FITR) clauses contained in investment treaties. It provides a 
comprehensive and detailed examination of the relevant arbitral case law, 
highlighting the co-existence of two formalistic approaches (based 
respectively on the distinction between treaty and contract claims and the 
lis pendens-related triple-identity test) with the more pragmatic 
fundamental-basis test established by the ICSID tribunal in Pantechniki v. 
Albanania and subsequently endorsed in H&H v. Egypt. This contribution 
critically examines these two strands of case law, emphasizing both the 
interpretive flaws of formalistic approaches and the inherent vagueness 
and ambiguity of the fundamental-basis test. In an attempt to overcome the 
deadlock resulting from the clash between formalistic and pragmatic 
decisions, this article offers a functional analysis of FITR clauses, 
providing new insights and guidance to treaty drafters and interpreters. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
Investor-state dispute resolution provisions contained in investment 
treaties frequently provide investors with a choice between different fora 
for the resolution of investment disputes. Those may include the domestic 
courts of the host State, contractually agreed arbitral or judicial fora, and, 
of course, treaty-based arbitral tribunals (these will hereinafter also be 
referred to as “investor-state arbitral tribunals”1). For reasons which will 
be discussed in more detail below,2 some investor-state dispute resolution 
clauses contain so-called “fork-in-the-road” (“FITR”) provisions, i.e., 
provisions that exclude, in one way or another, the possibility for an 
investor to submit one single investment dispute to more than one court or 
tribunal. 
For many years, FITR provisions have been the sleeping beauty of 
international investment law. Indeed, until rather recently, arbitral 
tribunals invariably rejected jurisdictional objections based on FITR 
clauses.3 The principal reason for this constant rejection was the rather 
rigid or “formalistic” analysis of the question of whether the dispute 
brought before the investor-state arbitral tribunal and the dispute(s) 
submitted to another court or tribunal are the same. Virtually all tribunals 
have held that strict identity between the two disputes is necessary in order 
for a FITR provision to bar the initiation of investor-state arbitration 
proceedings. While some tribunals have focused on the legal bases of the 
claims at stake,4 others have applied the so-called triple-identity test (or 
rule), requiring identity of parties, causes of action, and relief sought.5  
This situation changed completely when, in 2009, the sole arbitrator in 
Pantechniki v. Albania6 refused to follow the formalistic approach adopted 
in earlier decisions, opting instead for a more “pragmatic”7 test focusing 
 
 
1  It should be noted, however, that not every investor-state arbitral tribunal is necessarily a 
treaty-based arbitral tribunal. In fact, investor-state tribunals may also be established under a 
contractual dispute resolution provision. For the purposes of this article, however, the concept of 
investor-state (arbitral) tribunal is understood in the narrow sense of a treaty-based arbitral tribunal. 
2  See infra Section VII. 
3  For a detailed examination of the relevant case law, see infra Section IV. 
4  See infra Section IV.A. 
5  See infra Section IV.B. 
6  Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng’rs (Greece) v. Republic of Alb., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/21, Award (July 29, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C113/DC1133_En.pdf.  
7  See Fiona Marshall, Commentary: Pantechniki v. Albania Decision Offers Pragmatic 
Approach to Interpreting Fork-in-the-Road Clauses, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.: INV. 
TREATY NEWS (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/09/02/commentary-pantechniki-v-
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on the “fundamental basis”8 of the claims concerned, their “normative 
source[s],”9 and the question of whether the claim brought before the 
investor-state arbitral tribunal has an “autonomous existence”10 from the 
claim submitted to the other court or arbitral tribunal. On the basis of this 
test, the sole arbitrator declined his jurisdiction, holding that the ICSID 
arbitration proceedings in which the claimant alleged violations of various 
treaty standards had the same fundamental basis as the breach-of-contract 
claim which it had brought before the Albanian courts.11 
Following the decision in Pantechniki v. Albania, three other arbitral 
tribunals have ruled on FITR objections to jurisdiction. While the tribunals 
in Toto Costruzioni Generali v. Lebanon12 and Total v. Argentina13 
followed the traditional formalistic approach,14 the tribunal in H&H 
Enterprises Investments v. Egypt15 adopted the test established in 
Pantechniki.16 Pantechniki thus cannot be regarded as an isolated incident. 
Rather, one has to conclude that two contrasting approaches currently co-
exist as regards the requirements for the application of FITR clauses. 
The fundamental contrast between these two types of rulings has not 
received a great deal of attention in the international investment law 
literature. The most compelling post-Pantechniki discussion of FITR 
provisions is a 2010 publication authored by Wegen and Markert.17 These 
authors have welcomed the more pragmatic approach inherent to the 
Pantechniki and H&H rulings.18 However, they have also (and rightly so) 
pointed out that the fundamental-basis test is vague and that it does not 
 
 
albania-decision-offers-pragmatic-approach-to-interpreting-fork-in-the-road-clauses/.  
8  See Pantechniki, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 61. 
9  Id. ¶ 62. 
10  Id. ¶ 64. 
11  Id. ¶ 67. 
12  Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision 
on Jurisdiction (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C104/DC1191_En.pdf. 
13  Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability (Dec. 
27, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf.  
14  Toto Costruzioni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 203; Total S.A., 
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 443. 
15  H&H Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award 
(May 6, 2014), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C720/DC9652_En.pdf.  
16  Id. ¶¶ 368-70. 
17  Gerhard Wegen & Lars Markert, Investment Arbitration – Food for Thought on Fork-in-the-
Road – A Clause Awakens from Its Hibernation, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 269, 270 (C. Klausegger et. al. ed., 2010). 
18  Id. at 277 (observing that “[t]he overall approach regarding the scope of fork-in-the-road 
clauses in the Pantechniki v. Albania award is convincing and the proposed solution points down the 
right road”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/7
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therefore ensure a high degree of legal certainty and predictability.19 They 
have put forward interesting alternative solutions, primarily in the form of 
revisions of, and improvements to, the traditional triple-identity test.20 
This article seeks to take this analysis one step further. It examines 
formalistic and pragmatic approaches to the FITR issue, offering a detailed 
analysis of the relevant case law. It evaluates these conflicting views, both 
from an interpretive and from a normative point of view, and seeks to 
overcome the present clash between formalism and pragmatism by means 
of a functional analysis, i.e., an analysis based on the function or functions 
performed by FITR provisions. On the basis of this analysis, this article 
aims to identify solutions that are conducive to the effective performance 
of those functions. 
This contribution is divided into six main sections (Sections II to VII). 
Section II discusses the meaning and effects of FITR clauses and reviews 
the different types of FITR provisions found in investment treaties. 
Section III analyzes the terms of the FITR problem and provides an 
overview of possible solutions. Sections IV and V respectively explore 
two sets of arbitral rulings: those that follow a formalistic approach and 
those, more recent ones, which adopt a more pragmatic stance. Section VI 
evaluates each of these approaches from the perspective of treaty 
interpretation. Section VII offers a functional analysis of the FITR 
problem. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF FITR 
A. Meaning and effect of FITR provisions 
As has already been explained, FITR provisions are clauses that 
prohibit an investor from submitting an investment dispute to a particular 
court or tribunal if he has previously seized another court or tribunal of the 
same dispute. FITR provisions thus have a preclusive effect and deprive 
the second court or tribunal seized of its jurisdiction over the relevant 
dispute. When an investor opts for a particular dispute settlement 
mechanism available under an investment treaty, he is considered to have 
“taken the fork in the road,” with–in principle–no possibility of 
subsequently choosing a different path. 
In practice, as is easily understood, FITR provisions are usually relied 
 
 
19  Id. at 282 (noting that “the criterion ‘fundamental basis’ remains so vague that it hardly 
enhances legal certainty for investors”). 
20  Id. at 283-91. 
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upon to challenge the jurisdiction of investor-state arbitral tribunals, rather 
than to object to the jurisdiction of a domestic court or contract-based 
arbitral tribunal.21 In a typical scenario, the respondent state argues that 
initiation by the investor (or by an entity owned or controlled by the 
investor) of domestic court proceedings or of contractually agreed 
arbitration proceedings precludes recourse to investor-state arbitration. 
While the preclusive effect of FITR clauses is uncontroversial, the 
exact scope of this effect may raise interpretive questions. One such 
question relates to the effect of the discontinuance of the first proceeding 
by the investor. If, for example, an investor brings proceedings before the 
domestic courts of the host state and subsequently withdraws his claim, 
does this mean that the FITR clause no longer prevents him from initiating 
investor-state arbitration proceedings? Although there appears to be no 
case law on this particular point, a literal interpretation of typical FITR 
provisions would suggest that the discontinuance of the first proceeding 
does not have the effect of resurrecting the right to initiate investor-state 
arbitration proceedings.22  
Another question that may arise concerns so-called unilateral FITR 
provisions, i.e., provisions that only provide for the preclusive effect that 
the commencement of court or other proceedings has on the ability of the 
investor to resort to investor-state arbitration, without expressly dealing 
with the reverse scenario (i.e., the preclusive effect of the initiation of 
investor-state arbitration proceedings). Should such FITR clauses be 
interpreted–by analogy or extension–as preventing litigation or contract-
based arbitration once the relevant dispute has been submitted to an 
investor-state arbitral tribunal? Similar to the issue discussed in the 
preceding paragraph, this question does not seem to have been decided by 
any court or arbitral tribunal. Under a literal interpretation of the clauses 
concerned, however, a negative answer (i.e., a solution precluding 
reasoning by analogy or extension) would appear to be justified. 
 
 
 
21  There appears to be no reported case in which a state or state agency challenged the 
jurisdiction of a domestic court or contract-based arbitral tribunal on the basis of a FITR provision 
contained in an investment treaty. This may be due to several reasons. One likely reason is that 
domestic courts and contract-based arbitral tribunals may not be, or perceive themselves as being, 
bound by FITR provisions contained in investment treaties. Another reason has to do with the fact that, 
in practice, investor-state arbitration proceedings are typically initiated after the commencement of 
domestic court proceedings or contractually agreed arbitration proceedings. The invocation of the 
FITR provision before domestic courts or contract-based arbitral tribunals is thus often chronologically 
excluded. 
22  See infra Section II.B. Under the two principal types of FITR clauses, the loss of the right to 
initiate investor-state arbitration proceedings appears to be irrevocable. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/7
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B. Types of FITR provisions 
Treaty practice suggests that there are three main types of FITR 
provisions. First of all, there are clauses that provide that investors may 
only resort to investor-state arbitration if they have not previously 
submitted the dispute to another court or tribunal. The US-Argentina 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”)23 for example, allows investors to 
bring disputes before an investor-state arbitral tribunal, provided that the 
investor “has not submitted the dispute for resolution under paragraph 2(a) 
or (b) [of Art. VII of the treaty],”24 which provide for the submission of 
investment disputes “to the courts or administrative tribunals” of the host 
State or “in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute 
settlement procedures.”25 A number of other BITs concluded by the 
United States, including, for example, those entered into with Estonia,26 
the Czech Republic27 and Egypt,28 contain similar FITR clauses.29 
Secondly, there are clauses that provide investors with a choice 
between several dispute settlement mechanisms, specifying that once the 
investor has made a choice, the choice is final. In such clauses, which can 
notably be found in the France-Argentina,30 Chile-Spain,31 and Lebanon-
Italy32 BITs, the preclusive effect of the relevant clauses derives from the 
reference to the finality (or irrevocability) of the investor’s choice. 
Lastly, there are treaty provisions that may be regarded as implied 
FITR clauses. Similarly to the provisions referred to in the previous 
paragraph, these clauses offer investors a choice between several dispute 
 
 
23  Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Arg.-U.S., 
Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT].  
24  Id. art. VII(3)(a). 
25  Id. art. VII(2)(a) and (b). 
26  Treaty for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Est., Apr. 19, 
1994, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-38 (1994) [hereinafter U.S.-Estonia BIT]. 
27  Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-
Czechoslovakia, Oct. 22, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-31 (1992) [hereinafter U.S.-Czechoslovakia 
BIT].  
28  Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-
Egypt, Mar. 11, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 99-24 (1988) [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt BIT]. 
29  U.S.-Estonia BIT, supra note 26, art. VI(3)(a); U.S.-Czechoslovakia BIT, supra note 27, art. 
VI(3)(a)(i); U.S.-Egypt BIT, supra note 28, art. VII(3)(a)(ii) and (iii). 
30  See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Fr.-Arg., art. 
8(2), July 3, 1991, 1728 U.N.T.S. 297.  
31  See Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, Spain-Chile, 
Oct. 2, 1991, 1774 U.N.T.S. 24. 
32  See Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Leb.-It., Nov. 7, 
1997, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/2090. 
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settlement mechanisms, without, however, stating that the choice made by 
the investor is final.33 In light of the absence of any reference to the 
“finality” of the investor’s choice, it is debatable whether such clauses are 
properly regarded as FITR provisions.34 However, considering that they 
require investors to choose one particular dispute settlement mechanism, it 
can indeed be argued that, by implication, the non-chosen options are no 
longer available once the investor has made his choice. At least one 
arbitral tribunal has endorsed such an approach.35 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
A. The question: Are the two disputes concerned the same? 
Jurisdictional objections based on FITR provisions pose one simple 
question: Is the dispute brought before a domestic court and/or contract-
based arbitral tribunal the same as the dispute brought before the investor-
state arbitral tribunal?  
In practice, virtually all arbitral tribunals hearing FITR-based 
jurisdictional objections have, directly or indirectly, taken the view that 
“sameness” is the decisive question. The only apparent exception is the 
decision in Middle East Cement v. Egypt,36 in which the tribunal adopted a 
slightly different approach. Indeed, it examined not the sameness of the 
disputes submitted to the Egyptian court and the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) tribunal, but rather the 
question of whether the former dispute–in which the investor challenged 
the validity of an auction at which a ship owned by him was sold–could at 
all be qualified as an investment dispute.37 The rationale underlying this 
approach is that, if the domestic dispute cannot be characterized as an 
 
 
33  An example of such a clause can be found in art. 10(2) of the Albania-Greece BIT. See 
Agreement for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Alb.-Greece, Aug. 1, 
1991, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/treaty/18.  
34  The authors of a recent OECD survey take the view that such clauses do not constitute FITR 
provisions. See Joachim Pol et al., Dispute Settlement Provisions in International Investment 
Agreements: A Large Sample Survey 13 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2012/02, 2012), 
https://doi.org/10.1787/5k8xb71nf628-en (“About a third of the treaties [examined in the survey] do 
not clarify whether the initial choice made by investors is exclusive, thus suggesting that an investor 
could also choose both ways of dispute settlement.”). 
35  Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng’rs (Greece) v. The Republic of Alb., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/21, Award (July 30, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C113/DC1133_En.pdf. 
36  Middle E. Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/99/6, Award (Apr. 12, 2002), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C182/DC595_En.pdf.  
37  Id. ¶ 71. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/7
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investment dispute, then it cannot possibly be the same dispute as the 
investment dispute brought before ICSID. In the case at hand, the tribunal 
held that the domestic dispute did not constitute an investment dispute 
because it did not involve allegations of breaches of treaty standards,38 as 
required under the applicable BIT.39 
In arbitral practice, the FITR-related question of the sameness of two 
disputes typically arises in either of two scenarios. In the first scenario, the 
investor challenges a state measure (generally an administrative decision) 
in the host state’s domestic courts and subsequently initiates investor-state 
arbitration proceedings, alleging that the measure at stake violates the 
applicable investment treaty. In such cases, the host state will frequently 
rely on the treaty’s FITR provision, arguing that the dispute brought 
before the investor-state arbitral tribunal is the same as the one that the 
investor previously submitted to the domestic court. 
This type of scenario can be illustrated by the relevant facts of Enron v. 
Argentina.40 In this case, the investors (Enron Corporation and Ponderosa 
Assets, L.P.) indirectly owned a significant portion of the shares of TGS, a 
major local network for the transport and distribution of gas.41 When 
several Argentine provinces imposed stamp taxes in connection with 
TGS’s operations,42 TGS initiated proceedings in various Argentine 
courts, challenging the lawfulness of those tax measures.43 Presumably 
because TGS’s domestic claims had been unsuccessful, the claimants 
subsequently initiated investor-state arbitration proceedings under the US-
Argentina BIT, arguing that the tax measures at stake were in violation of 
the applicable BIT, general international law, and Argentine law.44 The 
relevant question in this scenario is whether the dispute brought before the 
investor-state arbitral tribunal is the same as the one heard by the 
Argentine courts.45 
In the second scenario, the investor and the host state enter into an 
 
 
38  Id. 
39  Art. 10(1) of the Egypt-Greece BIT defines investment disputes as “[d]isputes between an 
investor of a Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the latter 
under this Agreement.” See Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
Egypt-Greece, July 16, 1993, 95 U.N.X.X. 11, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mostRecent/treaty/1349.  
40  Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(Jan. 14, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0290.pdf.  
41  Id. ¶ 21. 
42  Id. ¶ 25. 
43  Id. ¶ 95. 
44  Id. ¶ 25. 
45  For the decision of the tribunal in Enron v. Argentina, see infra Section IV.A. 
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investment contract, and when a dispute arises in connection with that 
contract (for example, in relation to the host state’s payment obligations or 
its decision to terminate the contract), the investor initiates court or 
arbitration proceedings in accordance with the contractual forum-selection 
or arbitration clause. The investor’s claim in the contractual forum is 
unsuccessful (or, alternatively, no final decision is obtained during a 
prolonged time period) and the investor thus decides to initiate investor-
state arbitration proceedings, generally claiming that the host state’s 
alleged breach of contract amounts to a violation of one or several treaty 
standards. 
A useful illustration for this scenario is provided by the facts of Toto 
Costruzioni v. Lebanon.46 In this case, the claimant and Lebanon had 
entered into a contract for the construction of a portion of a highway.47 A 
dispute arose between the parties when Lebanon refused to compensate the 
claimant for various additional costs allegedly incurred in connection with 
its performance under the contract,48 and the claimant ultimately filed two 
breach-of-contract claims in the competent administrative court (the 
Conseil d’Etat).49 Subsequently,50 the investor initiated ICSID arbitration 
proceedings under the Italy-Lebanon BIT, arguing that Lebanon’s conduct 
was in violation of several applicable treaty standards.51 The question in 
this scenario is, once more, whether this dispute is the same as the one(s) 
brought before the Conseil d’Etat.52 
B. Possible answers 
When attempting to determine a suitable answer to the question of 
when two disputes can be regarded as the same for the purposes of the 
FITR problem, it is useful to start with an analysis of the key concept, i.e., 
the concept of dispute. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the concept of 
dispute as a “conflict or controversy, esp. one that has given rise to a 
particular lawsuit.”53 In the specific context of public international law, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) famously defined 
 
 
46  Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on 
Jurisdiction (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C104/DC1191_En.pdf. 
47  Id. ¶ 16. 
48  Id. ¶ 19. 
49  Id. ¶ 20. 
50  The outcome of the local proceedings is not discussed in the tribunal’s decision. 
51  Toto Costruzioni, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 25. 
52  For the decision of the arbitral tribunal, see infra Section IV.B(2). 
53  Dispute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/7
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the concept of dispute as “a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a 
conflict of legal views or of interests between two persons.”54 A similar 
definition has been adopted by the ICJ in its advisory opinion in the Peace 
Treaties case55 in which the Court ruled that a dispute had arisen between 
the parties concerned given that they “h[e]ld clearly opposite views” 
concerning certain treaty obligations.56 
Such general definitions of the notion of dispute are not particularly 
helpful for present purposes. First of all, these definitions merely explain 
what a (legal) dispute is, without offering any guidance as to the 
determination of whether two disputes brought before different courts or 
tribunals can be considered as the same. Also, as regards the PCIJ, its 
definition was adopted in the context of the Court’s examination of a 
particular jurisdictional requirement, namely the existence of a dispute,57 
which is a problem quite different from the one this article is concerned 
with (the sameness of two disputes). 
For the purposes of the FITR problem, it is thus more appropriate to 
focus on the particular characteristics that define a dispute (and, 
presumably, distinguish it from other disputes). While the specific 
terminology may vary from one legal system to another, it is 
uncontroversial that a dispute is characterized by four primary features: (1) 
the particular parties to the dispute, (2) the relief or reliefs requested by the 
parties, (3) the factual bases upon which the parties’ requests rely, and (4) 
the relevant legal basis or bases, i.e., the legal provisions and authorities 
that the parties invoke in support of their respective claims. 
Identifying the characteristic features of the notion of dispute is not, 
however, sufficient to provide an answer to the “sameness” question. In 
fact, it can be asked whether sameness requires identity of all relevant 
features or whether identity of some of these characteristics (and if so, of 
which ones) is sufficient. And if identity of a particular feature is required, 
what exactly does identity mean? What degree of identity must be present? 
Where, for example, a claimant brings two otherwise identical breach-of-
 
 
54  Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Collection of Judgments, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, 
at 11 (Aug, 30). For commentary on the concept of dispute in the field of public international law, see 
Christoph Schreuer, What is a Legal Dispute?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW BETWEEN UNIVERSALISM 
AND FRAGMENTATION 959 (Isabelle Buffard et al. eds, 2008). 
55  Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Advisory Opinion, 
1950 I.C.J. 65. (Mar. 30). 
56  Id. at 74. 
57  See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. at 11. The specific question before 
the Court was whether a dispute existed under Article 26 of the Mandate for Palestine conferred upon 
the British monarch.  
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contract claims before two different courts, does asking for different 
amounts of compensation cause the two disputes not to be the same? 
Similar questions may be asked in connection with other characteristic 
features. 
As has already been mentioned, arbitral practice has shown a strong 
preference for a formalistic approach requiring strict identity of some or 
all relevant features. Another approach, which rejects formalistic rules and 
which can be labeled as “pragmatic,” applies a less demanding, more 
flexible threshold. The following two sections provide a detailed analysis 
of the relevant case law. 
IV. FORMALISTIC APPROACHES 
A. Approach based on the distinction between treaty and contract 
claims 
The distinction between treaty58 and contract claims59 is a fundamental 
distinction of international investment law.60 It is of primary importance 
for the question of whether contractual forum-selection (or arbitration) 
clauses prevent treaty-based investor-state arbitral tribunals from hearing 
claims alleging treaty breaches where those alleged breaches are related to 
the underlying investment contract (and/or may be constitutive of 
contractual breaches). The generally accepted answer to this question is 
that, since contract and treaty claims are different, contractual forum-
selection (or arbitration) clauses have no impact on the ability of treaty-
based arbitral tribunals to hear claims alleging treaty breaches.61 As will 
be shown below, the distinction between treaty and contract claims is also 
relevant in the context of FITR decisions. 
There are at least four FITR rulings in which investor-state arbitral 
tribunals have expressly relied on, or at least referred to, the distinction 
between treaty and contract claims. In CMS v. Argentina,62 for example, 
 
 
58  A treaty claim is a claim in which the claimant alleges that the respondent breached one or 
several provisions of the applicable treaty.  
59  In this particular context, a contract claim is a claim alleging a breach of the applicable 
investment contract.  
60  For commentary, see James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, 24 
ARB. INT’L 351 (2008). 
61  See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 276 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that, according to a “consistent practice[,] the treaty-
based jurisdiction of international arbitral tribunals to decide on violations of these treaties is not 
affected by domestic forum selection clauses in contracts”). 
62  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction (July 17, 2003), 7 ICSID Rep. 492 (2003).  
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CMS owned roughly thirty percent of the shares of TGN, a local 
Argentine company holding a license for the transportation of gas.63 When 
a disagreement arose between the Argentine government, the gas regulator 
ENARGS, and TGN, the Argentine Ombudsman initiated proceedings in 
which TGN intervened as a third party.64 The Argentine government, 
ENARGS, and TGN all appealed the decision rendered by the Argentine 
court. When CMS initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings under the US-
Argentina BIT, Argentina argued that CMS was precluded from doing so 
under the treaty’s FITR provision.65 
In its decision rejecting Argentina’s objection, the arbitral tribunal 
observed that “several ICSID tribunals have held that as contractual claims 
are different from treaty claims even if there had been or there currently 
was a recourse to the local courts for breach of contract, this would not 
have prevented submission of the treaty claims to arbitration.”66 In the 
case at hand, the rejection of Argentina’s FITR defense was particularly 
unproblematic since “no submission [at all] [had] been made by CMS to 
local courts.”67 
In Azurix v. Argentina,68 ABA, a local Argentine company owned by 
Azurix, entered into a water and sewerage concession contract with the 
Province of Buenos Aires.69 When the Province adopted a decree 
rescinding the concession contract, ABA brought proceedings in the local 
courts challenging the validity of the relevant decree.70 Azurix 
subsequently initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings under the US-
Argentina BIT, and Argentina invoked the treaty’s FITR clause to object 
to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
In its decision rejecting Argentina’s objection, the arbitral tribunal not 
only relied on the triple-identity-test,71 but also approvingly referred to the 
reasoning of the CMS tribunal and to its distinction between treaty and 
 
 
63  Id. ¶ 19. 
64  The tribunal’s decision does not contain any details as regards these local proceedings. In 
particular, it is not known what their outcome was. 
65  U.S.-Argentina BIT, supra note 23, art. VII(3)(a). 
66  CMS Gas Transmission Co., 7 ICSID Rep. 492, ¶ 80. 
67  Id. 
68  Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(Dec. 8, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 262 (2004), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C5/DC506_En.pdf. 
69  Id. ¶ 22. 
70  Id. ¶ 86. 
71  Id. ¶ 88. 
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contract claims.72 Ultimately, the decisive consideration underlying the 
tribunal’s decision appears to have been the fact that neither of the parties 
to the ICSID arbitration proceedings were parties to the proceedings in the 
local Argentine courts.73 
Enron v. Argentina74 involved, as has already been explained, a dispute 
between TGS, a major local network for the transportation and distribution 
of gas partly owned by Enron,75 and certain Argentine provinces. The 
provinces concerned had required TGS to pay stamp taxes on various 
operations,76 and TGS brought proceedings in several Argentine courts to 
challenge the validity of these tax measures under Argentine law.77 When 
Enron initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings under the US-Argentina 
BIT, Argentina objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction on the basis of the 
treaty’s FITR provision. 
In its decision, the arbitral tribunal reviewed earlier FITR cases, 
observing that those cases had highlighted “the difference between the 
violation of a contract and the violation of a treaty.”78 It therefore 
concluded that “even if there was recourse to local courts for breach of 
contract this would not prevent resorting to ICSID arbitration for violation 
of treaty rights.”79 The tribunal held that, since TGS had submitted claims 
arising under Argentine law to the local courts, Enron was not precluded 
from submitting treaty claims to an ICSID tribunal.80 It should be noted 
that the tribunal also referred to the lis pendens rule,81 the requirements of 
which it held not to be met in the present case, notably because the 
claimants in the ICSID arbitration proceedings and the claimant in the 
local proceedings were different entities.82 
In Occidental v. Ecuador,83 Occidental had undertaken the exploration 
and production of oil under a participation contract concluded with 
Petroecuador, a state-owned entity.84 During a period of about two years, 
 
 
72  Id. ¶ 89. 
73  Id. ¶ 90. 
74  Enron Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(Jan. 14, 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0290.pdf. 
75  Id. ¶ 21. 
76  Id. ¶ 25. 
77  Id. ¶ 95. 
78  Id. ¶ 97. 
79  Id.  
80  Id. ¶ 98. 
81  Id. ¶ 97. For a discussion of this principle, see infra Section IV.B(1). 
82  Id. ¶ 98. 
83  Occidental Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN 3467, Final Award, 
(London Ct. Int’l Arb. 2004), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0571.pdf. 
84  Id. ¶ 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] THE FORK IN THE ROAD REVISITED 405 
 
 
 
 
Occidental had regularly applied and obtained the reimbursement of VAT 
on various purchases it made in connection with its operations. When, in 
2001, the Ecuadorian tax authority adopted resolutions denying all further 
reimbursement applications and requiring the return of the amounts 
previously reimbursed,85 Occidental filed a number of lawsuits in the 
Ecuadorian tax courts, challenging the validity of the relevant 
resolutions.86 While those local proceedings were still pending, Occidental 
also initiated investor-state arbitration proceedings under the US-Ecuador 
BIT, alleging various breaches of this treaty.87 Ecuador challenged the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal on various grounds, including on the 
basis of the treaty’s FITR clause. 
The UNICTRAL tribunal reviewed earlier decisions applying both the 
triple-identity test88 and the distinction between treaty and contract claims, 
focusing in particular on the ruling in CMS v. Argentina.89 However, it 
appears to have applied a more nuanced or complex rule, observing that it 
is necessary to take into account “the specific circumstances of the 
dispute”90 and holding that a treaty-based arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction 
“[t]o the extent that the nature of the dispute submitted to arbitration is 
principally, albeit not exclusively, treaty-based.”91 On the basis of this test 
the tribunal rejected Ecuador’s FITR defense.92 
The interpretive and normative merits of the decisions in CMS v. 
Argentina, Azurix v. Argentina, Enron v. Argentina, and Occidental v. 
Ecuador will be discussed below in Sections VI and VII. At this point, two 
comments are in order. First of all, it is interesting to note that at least 
three of these four cases did not involve any contract claims brought 
before domestic courts. Enron and Occidental involved challenges 
directed against administrative measures (tax impositions), while CMS did 
not involve any domestic claim filed by the investor (or any of his 
subsidiaries) at all. Strictly speaking, the distinction between treaty and 
contract claims should not, therefore, be applicable in the cases concerned. 
Second, the test applied by these tribunals is far from clear. In three of 
these decisions, there are references to rules or concepts other than the 
 
 
85  Id. ¶ 3. 
86  Id. ¶ 4. 
87  Id. ¶ 6. 
88  Id. ¶ 52. 
89  Id. ¶ 51. 
90  Id. ¶ 57. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. ¶ 63. 
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distinction between contract and treaty claims. The decisions in Azurix and 
Occidental contain express references to the triple-identity test, and the 
Enron ruling relies on the essentially identical lis pendens principle. It is 
thus not clear what exact rule these tribunals have applied. Is it the 
distinction between treaty and contract claims, the triple-identity (lis 
pendens) rule, or both? The factual considerations relied upon by the 
tribunals in support of their decisions do not provide a conclusive answer 
to this question. 
B. Approach based on the triple-identity test 
1. The origins of the triple-identity test: the lis pendens principle 
In the context of investor-state arbitration, the first decision in which an 
arbitral tribunal applied the triple-identity test was the decision of the 
ICSID tribunal in Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Congo.93 It is important to 
clarify that this case did not involve any FITR-based jurisdictional 
objection, but an objection based on the principle of lis pendens. 
Interestingly, despite the differences in the applicable legal bases, a 
number of arbitral tribunals have applied the test established by the 
Benvenuti & Bonfant tribunal in the context of their FITR determinations. 
Since all of these cases are thus indirectly based on the principle of lis 
pendens, it is important to briefly elaborate on its meaning and, more 
particularly, on the requirements for its application. 
Simply put, lis pendens is a principle that prevents a court from hearing 
a case that is already pending before a different court or tribunal. An 
insightful codification of this principle can be found in Art. 29 of the 
Brussels I Regulation.94 Under this provision, a court of an EU member 
state is prevented from hearing a dispute whenever “proceedings involving 
the same cause of action and between the same parties” have already been 
brought before a court or tribunal of another EU member state.95 
While it is not necessary to provide a detailed analysis of the lis 
pendens principle, whether generally or with specific reference to the rule 
contained in the Brussels I Regulation, two observations are relevant for 
present purposes. First, it has to be noted that it is not entirely clear to 
 
 
93  Benvenuti et Bonfant s.r.l. v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, 
Award (Aug. 8, 1980), 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982). 
94  Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 
on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
2012 O.J. (L 351), art. 29 [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]. 
95  Id. art. 29(1).  
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what extent the triple-identity test applied by the Benvenuti & Bonfant and 
other investor-state arbitral tribunals matches the lis pendens rule, notably 
as laid down in the Brussels I Regulation. In fact, there appears to be some 
degree of inconsistency between the French and English versions of the 
relevant provision. While the English version suggests that the applicable 
requirement is dual identity of parties and causes of action, the French 
version,96 which refers to the concepts of “object” and “cause” of the 
claims concerned, provides support for the view that triple identity of 
parties, causes of action, and relief sought is required. In fact, it is 
generally accepted that the term “cause” refers to the factual and legal 
basis of a claim, while the term “object” pertains to the relief requested or 
to “the ends [the parties] have in view.”97 
Second, it is important to highlight that both the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) and the courts of the member states have interpreted the 
requirements of identity of parties and causes of action rather flexibly. For 
example, as far as the former is concerned, an English court has held that a 
wholly-owned subsidiary may be regarded as the same party as its 
parent.98 Similarly, as regards identity of causes of action, the ECJ has 
adopted a particularly flexible approach in holding that a seller’s claim for 
the payment of the purchase price involved the same cause of action as the 
buyer’s request for a declaration of non-liability or contract termination.99 
2. The first decision applying the triple-identity test: Benvenuti & 
Bonfant v. Congo (1980) 
In this case, Benvenuti & Bonfant entered into a contract with the 
Republic of Congo under which the parties agreed to establish a joint 
venture company (later incorporated as the PLASCO company) for the 
purposes of financing and commissioning the construction of a plant for 
the manufacture of plastic bottles.100 When a dispute arose between the 
parties, Bevenuti & Bonfant initiated ICSID arbitration proceedings in 
 
 
96  The relevant part of art. 29(1) reads: “lorsque des demandes ayant le même objet et la même 
cause sont formées entre les mêmes parties.” 
97  See DICEY, MORRIS, & COLLINS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 494 (Sir Lawrence Collins et al. 
eds., 2006). 
98  Berkeley Admin. Inc. v. McClelland [1995] ILPr 201 (CA) (Eng.). It should be pointed out 
that this case was decided under the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation, namely the 
Brussels/Lugano Convention. Also, it needs to be clarified that the issue of the identity of the parties 
did not arise under the applicable lis pendens rule but under the related res judicata principle. 
99  Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik v. Palumbo, 1987 E.C.R. 4871. 
100 Benvenuti et Bonfant s.r.l. v. People’s Republic of the Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2, 
Award, 748 (Aug. 8, 1980), 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982). 
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accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the contract.101 The 
Congo raised a jurisdictional objection based on the principle of lis 
pendens, relying on the existence of proceedings which the Republic had 
initiated in the Revolutionary Court of Brazzaville against Mr. Bonfant in 
his capacity as agent of PLASCO.102 
Addressing the merits of the Republic’s objection, the arbitral tribunal 
considered that a stay of proceedings required “identity of the parties, of 
the subject matter, and of the cause of the suits pending before the two 
tribunals.”103 On the basis of this threshold, the arbitral tribunal rejected 
the Congo’s lis pendens objection, noting that the dispute before the 
Congolese court involved Mr. Bonfant, and not the company Benvenuti & 
Bonfant, claimant in the ICSID arbitration proceedings.104 
3. Subsequent decisions endorsing the triple-identity test 
As has already been mentioned, a number of tribunals have based their 
FITR rulings on a combination of the triple-identity test and the distinction 
between treaty and contract claims. Indeed, references to the triple-identity 
test can be found in the aforementioned Azurix, Enron, and Occidental 
decisions. 
In two more recent rulings arbitral tribunals have relied exclusively on 
the triple-identity rule, without referring to the distinction between treaty 
and contract claims. The first such decision is the award of the ICSID 
tribunal in Pey Casado v. Chile.105 In this case, Mr. Pey Casado and the 
President Allende Foundation brought ICSID arbitration proceedings 
against the Republic of Chile under the Spain-Chile BIT, alleging various 
violations of that treaty. The Republic raised several jurisdictional 
objections, including an objection based on the FITR clause contained in 
the treaty. This objection was based on the initiation by the claimants of 
two proceedings in the Chilean courts: a claim for restitution of a specific 
asset confiscated by Chile, the so-called “GOSS” rotary,106 and a claim for 
restitution of the shares of a company owned by the claimants,107 which 
had also been confiscated by the State.108 
 
 
101 Id. at 741. 
102 Id. at 744. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Pey Casado v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award (May 8, 2008), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0639.pdf. 
106 Id. ¶ 78. 
107 Id. ¶ 77. 
108 Id. ¶ 73. 
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Dealing with Chile’s FITR-based jurisdictional objection, the arbitral 
tribunal unequivocally endorsed the triple-identity test. It held that the 
application of a FITR provision required that the claims brought before the 
domestic courts and the ICSID arbitral tribunal have the same object, are 
based on the same fondement (foundation) and involve the same parties.109 
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the arbitral tribunal held that the 
claim whereby the claimants requested the restitution of the rotary Goss 
had expressly been excluded from the scope of the ICSID arbitration 
proceedings110 and that, therefore, this claim did not involve the same 
cause of action as the ICSID arbitration proceedings.111 Interestingly, 
though, the arbitral tribunal did not directly address the question of 
whether the initiation of the proceedings related to the allegedly 
confiscated company shares could be considered as a choice under the 
treaty’s FITR provision.  
Another case in which an arbitral tribunal exclusively applied the 
triple-identity rule is the aforementioned decision in Toto Costruzioni v. 
Lebanon.112 As has already been explained, this case involved a dispute 
between an Italian contractor and the Lebanese Republic arising in 
connection with a contract for the construction of a segment of the 
highway linking Beirut and Damascus.113 Toto Costruzioni brought two 
breach-of-contract claims in the local administrative courts, claiming 
compensation for various additional costs incurred in connection with the 
performance of its work.114 It subsequently also initiated ICSID arbitration 
proceedings, arguing that the Lebanon’s refusal to pay the amounts 
concerned constituted a violation of several treaty standards.115  
Addressing the respondent’s FITR objection, the arbitral tribunal held 
that it would only lack jurisdiction if “a claim with the same object, parties 
and cause of action (had) already (been) brought before a different judicial 
forum.”116 In the case before it, the ICSID claim involved allegations of 
treaty breaches, while the claim brought before the Lebanese courts was 
based on the contract (and presumably Lebanese law as the governing 
 
 
109 Id. ¶ 483. 
110 Id. ¶ 487-88. 
111 Id. ¶ 491. 
112 Toto Costruzioni Generali S.P.A. v. The Republic of Leb., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, 
Decision on Jurisdiction (Sept. 11, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C104/DC1191_En.pdf. 
113 Id. ¶ 16. 
114 Id. ¶ 20. 
115 Id. ¶ 25. 
116 Id. ¶ 211. 
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law). The tribunal thus dismissed the Lebanon’s FITR objection.117 
4. Decisions applying selected elements of the triple-identity test 
In a number of cases arbitral tribunals have failed to specify what FITR 
rule they chose to apply. Instead, they have simply stated the reasons for 
their rejection of the FITR-based jurisdictional objections raised by the 
respondents. Those reasons were almost always related to one or two of 
the criteria applied under the triple-identity test. However, absent an 
express recognition of this test, the legal significance of these decisions 
remains somewhat unclear. 
Lack of identity of the parties appears to have been a relevant factor for 
the decisions in Olguín v. Paraguay,118 Lauder v. Czech Republic,119 
LG&E v. Argentina,120 Pan American v. Argentina,121 and Total v. 
Argentina.122 In Lauder, LG&E, and Total, the claimants in the domestic 
court/contractual arbitration proceedings were separate legal entities from 
the claimants in the investor-state arbitration proceedings, wholly or partly 
owned by the latter.123 In Olguín and Pan American, there was a lack of 
identity of the respondents in the relevant disputes. In Olguín, the claimant 
had purchased bonds from a finance company, the payment of which was 
allegedly guaranteed by the Paraguayan government. The domestic 
proceedings in this case were brought against the finance company 
(Olguín sought a decision declaring the company bankrupt), and not 
against Paraguay.124 Similarly, in Pan American, the domestic 
 
 
117 Id. ¶ 212. 
118 Olguín v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 8, 
2000), 18 ICSID Rev. 133 (2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 156 (2004), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C171/DC574_Sp.pdf.  
119 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award (Sept. 3 2001), 9 ICSID Rep. 66 (2002), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf.  
120 LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on 
Objections to Jurisdiction (Apr. 30, 2004), 21 ICSID Rev. 155 (2006), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C208/DC626_En.pdf. 
121 BP America Prod. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on 
Preliminary Objections (July 27, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/ita0097.pdf. 
122 Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability (Dec. 
27, 2010), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C30/DC7833_En.pdf. 
123 Lauder, 9 ICSID Rep. 66, ¶ 143 (providing an overview of the court and arbitration 
proceedings initiated by entities owned, in whole or in part, by Mr. Lauder); LG&E Energy Corp., 21 
ICSID Rev. 155, ¶ 75 (explaining that it was the licensees and not the claimants in the ICSID 
proceedings that seized the Argentine courts of various disputes); Total S.A., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 443. 
124 Olguín v. Republic of Para., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, Decision on Jurisdiction (Aug. 8, 
2000), 18 ICSID Rev. 133 (2003), 6 ICSID Rep. 156 (2004), 
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proceedings were initiated by one of the claimants against a third party 
that owned a piece of land on which the claimants conducted some of their 
oil and gas extraction operations, and not against Argentina.125 
In three of the five decisions mentioned above, the lack of either 
identical causes of action or identical legal bases was a decisive factor. In 
Lauder and Total, the tribunals based their decisions at least in part on the 
absence of identical legal bases. In Lauder, none of the judicial and 
arbitral proceedings initiated by corporations directly or indirectly owned 
by Mr. Lauder involved allegations of breaches of the BIT between the 
U.S. and the Czech Republic,126 which was the legal basis of the dispute 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal. In Total, the challenge of the relevant tax 
measures in the Argentine courts was based on domestic Argentine law 
and not on the BIT between France and Argentina, which served as the 
legal basis for Total’s ICSID claim.127 In Pan American, the tribunal 
rejected the respondent’s FITR-based objection at least in part on the 
grounds that there was no identity between the causes of action of the 
disputes concerned.128 
One arbitral tribunal, namely the tribunal in Olguín v. Paraguay, 
attached importance to the fact that the relief requested in the two 
proceedings was not the same. In the case before the tribunal, the 
respondent alleged that the claimant had initiated proceedings in the 
Paraguayan courts, seeking an order declaring the bankruptcy of the 
finance company whose obligations were allegedly guaranteed by 
Paraguay. As has been explained above, the lack of identical respondents 
in these two cases was one reason for the tribunal to reject Paraguay’s 
FITR argument. Another reason was that the relief requested by the 
claimant in the domestic proceedings was not identical to the relief sought 
in the ICSID arbitration proceedings. The tribunal noted in this respect 
that the claimant had not commenced proceedings in the local courts “in 
order to collect [the] payment . . . which he is seeking to collect in the 
present arbitration case.”129 
Finally, at least one decision refers to the requirement that the relevant 
legal issues in the two disputes must be identical. Such a reference can be 
 
 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C171/DC574_Sp.pdf. 
125 BP America, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ¶¶ 154-57. 
126 Lauder, 9 ICSID Rep. 66, ¶¶ 163-65. 
127 Total S.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability, ¶ 443. 
128 BP America, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ¶ 157. 
129 Olguín, 6 ICSID Rep. 156, ¶ 30. 
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found in Genin v. Estonia.130 In this case, EIB, a company owned by Mr. 
Genin and one of the claimants in the ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
purchased a branch of the state-owned Social Bank.131 Various difficulties 
arose in connection with this transaction, and EIB ultimately brought two 
separate proceedings in the Estonian courts: a breach-of-contract claim 
against Social Bank132 and administrative proceedings challenging the 
revocation of EIB’s banking license.133 In its decision rejecting Estonia’s 
FITR defense, the arbitral tribunal notably relied on the fact that the ICSID 
arbitration proceedings and the disputes submitted to the Estonian courts 
did not involve the same issues.134 
5. Concluding observations 
Three observations can be made to conclude this discussion of the 
triple-identity test. First of all, as has been explained, it is interesting to see 
that the triple-identity approach is not based on an interpretation of the 
FITR provisions. It has found its way into the FITR case law almost by 
accident, namely via a decision based on the principle of lis pendens. 
Second, only a few tribunals have expressly and exclusively referred to the 
triple-identity test, with a significant number of decisions referring to a 
combination of rules or fragments of the triple-identity test. Third, and 
lastly, arbitral tribunals applying the triple-identity test in the context of 
FITR rulings seem to have followed a much stricter and more formalistic 
approach than courts applying the lis pendens principle. 
V. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH: THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS TEST 
A. The forerunner: The Vivendi v. Argentina annulment decision 
Vivendi v. Argentina135 did not (and could not) involve any FITR-based 
jurisdictional objection given that the claimants in the ICSID arbitration 
 
 
130 Genin v. Republic of Est., ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, Award (June 25, 2001), 17 ICSID 
Rev. 395 (2002), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C178/DC592_En.pdf.  
131 Id. ¶¶ 43-44. 
132 Id. ¶ 47. 
133 Id. ¶ 58. 
134 Id. ¶¶ 331-32. 
135 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3 [hereinafter Vivendi], Award (Nov. 21, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 641 (2001), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C159/DC548_En.pdf; Vivendi, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID Rep. 340 (2004), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C159/DC552_En.pdf. 
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proceedings did not initiate any other proceedings prior to referring the 
case to ICSID. However, for reasons which will be explained below, both 
the ICSID arbitral tribunal and the ad hoc committee hearing the 
claimants’ annulment claim ruled on the potential applicability of the 
FITR provision contained in the applicable treaty, the BIT between France 
and Argentina.136 While the ruling of the arbitral tribunal endorses a 
formalistic approach to FITR clauses, the decision of the ad hoc 
committee expressly rejects such formalism, thus paving the way for the 
more pragmatic decisions rendered subsequently. 
In this case, the claimants had entered into a water and sewage 
concession contract with the Argentine province of Tucuman.137 Various 
disagreements arose in connection with the performance of this contract 
and the claimants ultimately commenced ICSID arbitration proceedings. 
They submitted two types of claims to the ICSID tribunal: (1) the “federal 
claims” in which the investors argued that certain conduct of the federal 
government amounted to breaches of the applicable BIT, and (2) the 
“Tucuman claims” that involved allegations of treaty breaches perpetrated 
by the province of Tucuman, arguably attributable to the Argentine 
Republic. 
Argentina objected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, principally on the 
grounds that the dispute was a contractual dispute over which the courts of 
Tucuman had exclusive jurisdiction under the forum-selection clause 
contained in the contract.138 The arbitral tribunal rejected this 
jurisdictional objection, holding that the forum-selection clause did not 
constitute a waiver on the part of the investors to bring treaty claims 
before an ICSID arbitral tribunal.139 It thus endorsed the - at that point in 
time relatively novel – distinction between treaty and contract claims. On 
the merits, the arbitral tribunal rejected the federal claims.140 As far as the 
Tucuman claims were concerned, the tribunal somewhat surprisingly–and 
in apparent contradiction with its jurisdictional holding–declined to 
examine them, stating that those claims should be heard by the competent 
administrative courts of Tucuman, and that an ICSID tribunal could only 
hear the relevant claims in the event that the claimants “have been denied 
their rights, either procedurally or substantively.”141 
 
 
136 France-Argentina BIT, supra note 30, art. 8(2). 
137 Vivendi, 16 ICSID Rev. 641, Award, ¶ 25. 
138 Id. ¶ 47. 
139 Id. ¶ 53. 
140 Id. ¶ 92. 
141 Id. ¶ 78. 
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As far as the BIT’s FITR provision was concerned, it was relied upon 
not by the respondent, but by the claimants in the context of their response 
to Argentina’s jurisdictional objection. Specifically, the claimants 
explained that the reason for not submitting the dispute to the 
administrative courts of Tucuman was that the initiation of such 
proceedings would have triggered the FITR under Art. 8(2) of the France-
Argentina BIT.142 The arbitral tribunal disagreed with the claimants’ 
viewpoint, observing that “a suit by Claimants against Tucuman in the 
administrative courts of Tucuman . . . would not have foreclosed 
Claimant[s] from subsequently seeking a remedy against the Argentine 
Republic as provided in the BIT and ICSID Convention.”143 The tribunal 
based this conclusion on its analysis of the effect of the contract’s forum-
selection clause and the distinction between treaty and contract claims. 
The claimants subsequently brought annulment proceedings, 
challenging the tribunal’s decision not to examine the merits of the 
Tucuman claims. The ad hoc committee held that such refusal constituted 
a manifest excess of powers,144 basing its finding in part on its 
disagreement with the tribunal’s analysis of the FITR issue. In fact, the 
committee took the view that by initiating ICSID arbitration proceedings, 
the investors had “taken the ‘fork in the road’ under Article 8(4) [sic],”145 
and assumed the risk of “a tribunal holding that the acts complained of 
neither individually nor collectively rose to the level of a breach of the 
BIT.”146 It further observed that, “[i]n that event, [the investors] would 
have lost both [their] treaty claim and [their] contract claim.”147 
It is not entirely clear what the rationale underlying the ad hoc 
committee’s decision was, nor what specific FITR test the ad hoc 
committee believed appropriate. Indeed, in the paragraph immediately 
preceding its FITR conclusion, it examined an entirely different question, 
namely the obligation of the tribunal to decide the merits of the Tucuman 
claims. However, the ad hoc committee’s reasoning becomes apparent 
when one studies its analysis of the scope of the treaty’s investor-state 
dispute resolution provision. In light of the language of this clause (and, 
more specifically, the use of the broad expression “disputes related to 
investments”), the committee took the view that a breach-of-contract claim 
such as the one that the investors could have brought against Tucuman 
 
 
142 Id. ¶ 42. 
143 Id. ¶ 55. 
144 Vivendi, 6 ICSID Rep. 340, Decision on Annulment. 
145 Id. ¶ 113. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
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under the concession contract would fall within the scope of the treaty’s 
dispute resolution provision.148 It concluded that the initiation of such 
proceedings would prima facie constitute a choice of forum under the 
BIT’s FITR clause.149 
B. Pantechniki v. Albania150 (2009) 
In this case, Pantechniki and the General Road Directorate of Albania 
entered into two contracts for works on bridges and roads.151 Riots broke 
out in Albania and led to the almost full destruction of Pantechniki’s work 
site.152 Pantechniki claimed compensation for these losses,153 relying on a 
clause in the contracts (the “Employer’s Risk Clause”) which allocated the 
relevant risks to the Directorate.154 Following Pantechniki’s request, a 
special commission established by the Directorate evaluated the losses 
sustained by Pantechniki, arriving at a figure significantly below the 
amount claimed by the investor. Pantechniki nevertheless expressed its 
willingness to accept this amount.155 Writing to the Minister of Public 
Works, the Directorate recommended that the Minister make the necessary 
payment.156 A few months later, the Minister of Public Works invited the 
Minister of Finance to make the necessary payment, citing budgetary 
obstacles.157 
Despite the apparent willingness of the two Ministers to compensate 
Pantechniki for its losses, no payment was ever made. According to 
Pantechniki, the Albanian Finance Minister recommended initiating 
proceedings in the Albanian courts in order to facilitate the relevant 
disbursement.158 Pantechniki commenced proceedings in the district court 
of Tirana, arguing that the two letters mentioned above constituted, or at 
least evidenced, a settlement agreement which the Directorate and the 
Ministry of Public Works failed to honor (Pantechniki apparently did not 
 
 
148 Id. ¶ 55.  
149 Id. 
150 Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Eng’rs (Greece) v. Republic of Alb., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/21, Award (July 29, 2009), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C113/DC1133_En.pdf. 
151 Id. ¶ 12. 
152 Id. ¶ 13. 
153 Id. ¶ 14. 
154 Id. ¶ 63 n.3. 
155 Id. ¶ 15. 
156 Id. ¶ 16. 
157 Id. ¶ 17. 
158 Id. ¶ 56. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
416   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW   [VOL. 18:391 
 
 
 
argue a breach of the underlying road works contracts).159 The district 
court denied Pantechniki’s request on the grounds that the Employer’s 
Risk Clause was void under Albanian law insofar as it created liability 
without fault.160 This decision was affirmed by the court of appeal.161 
Pantechniki appealed from the decision of the latter court but subsequently 
decided to discontinue those proceedings, claiming that it believed it 
would not be treated fairly in the proceedings before the supreme court.162 
Not having obtained a favorable judgment in the Albanian courts, 
Pantechniki chose to initiate ICSID arbitration proceedings under the 
Albania-Greece BIT. In those proceedings, the investor alleged that 
Albania’s conduct violated various treaty standards and constituted a 
denial of justice.163 The respondent challenged the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral tribunal on several grounds, including on the basis of the treaty’s 
FITR provision. 
Relying on two precedents, namely the Woodfruff case decided by the 
American-Venezuelan Commission in 1903164 and the annulment decision 
in Vivendi v. Argentina discussed above, the sole arbitrator held that the 
relevant test was whether “the fundamental basis of the claim” brought 
before the investor-state arbitral tribunal was “autonomous of claims to be 
heard elsewhere.”165 Elaborating further on the relevant test, he noted that 
it was “necessary . . . to determine whether [the] claimed entitlements have 
the same normative source.”166 Elsewhere, the sole arbitrator referred to 
the need to “determine whether the [ICSID] claim truly does have an 
autonomous existence outside the contract.”167 
Applying this test to the facts of the case submitted to him, the sole 
arbitrator first examined the nature of the claim submitted to the Albanian 
courts. Unsurprisingly, he held that this claim was of contractual nature, 
emphasizing the fact that it was treated as such by those courts.168 He 
further observed that if the claimant’s claim in the Albanian courts had 
been successful, the claimant would have been granted the same relief that 
it requested in the ICSID arbitration proceedings, and, what is more, on 
 
 
159 Id. ¶ 21. 
160 Id. ¶ 3. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. ¶ 28. 
164 Woodruff Case, 9 R.I.A.A. 213, 223 (1903). 
165 Pantechniki, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award, ¶ 61. 
166 Id. ¶ 62. 
167 Id. ¶ 64. 
168 Id. ¶ 66. 
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the same fundamental basis.169 He concluded that under those 
circumstances Pantechniki was not entitled to have its claim heard by an 
ICSID tribunal.170 
The merits of the Pantechniki decision and other decisions adopting a 
similar approach will be discussed in some detail below in Sections VI and 
VII. Three comments are nevertheless called for at this stage of the 
analysis.  
First, it has to be noted that the sole arbitrator presented his FITR 
ruling as being in line with well-established case law, observing that the 
applicability of the fundamental-basis test was “common ground”171 and 
that this test “has been confirmed and applied in many subsequent 
cases.”172 This is of course not true. As has been explained, the 
predominant and largely unchallenged approaches followed in earlier 
decisions are the triple-identity test and the approach based on the 
distinction between treaty and contract claims. The award in Pantechniki 
must be regarded as marking a significant departure from these earlier 
rulings. 
Second, the sole arbitrator’s reliance on the Vivendi v. Argentina 
annulment decision is misconceived. In his award, the sole arbitrator 
claims that the fundamental-basis test was “revitalised”173 in this decision, 
suggesting that the ad hoc committee considered this test to be relevant for 
the purposes of making FITR determinations. In reality, the ad hoc 
committee relied on this test in order to establish that the arbitral tribunal, 
once it had affirmed its jurisdiction over the Tucuman claims, had a duty 
to rule on the merits of those claims. The committee pointed out that 
where the fundamental basis of a claim is a treaty standard, the existence 
of a forum-selection clause cannot “operate as a bar to the application of 
the treaty standard.”174 It concluded that an ICSID tribunal hearing a treaty 
claim could not decline to hear such a claim on the grounds that this claim 
“could or should have been dealt with by a national court” having 
jurisdiction under a contractual forum-selection clause.175 It is thus clear 
that the ad hoc committee did not refer to the fundamental basis test in the 
 
 
169 Id. ¶ 67. 
170 Id.  
171 Id. ¶ 61. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Vivendi, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 101 (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID 
Rep. 340 (2004), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C159/DC552_En.pdf. 
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context of its examination of the FITR issue, as suggested by the sole 
arbitrator in Pantechniki. 
Third, regardless of whether the rejection of the formalistic approaches 
followed by other tribunals is desirable as such, it has to be observed that 
the fundamental basis test advocated in Pantechniki and the related 
inquiries (Do the claims have the same normative source? Does the later 
claim have an autonomous existence?) are inherently vague and 
ambiguous.176 None of these inquiries involves established legal 
terminology, nor has the sole arbitrator provided any explanations as to the 
meaning of these terms. The approach applied by the sole arbitrator thus 
lacks legal certainty and predictability. 
C. H&H Enterprises Investments v. Egypt177 (2014) 
In this case, H&H Enterprises Investments and Grand Hotels of Egypt, 
a company owned by the government of Egypt, entered into a 
management and operation contract pertaining to a resort hotel.178 
According to H&H, Grand Hotels had granted it an option to buy the hotel 
and adjoining land.179 Disagreements arose between the parties which, 
according to H&H, were due to (1) Grand Hotels’ interference with 
H&H’s ability to perform the contract by not accepting its development 
plans and by preventing it from obtaining a permanent operating license, 
and (2) Grand Hotels’ failure to honor the investor’s option to buy.180 
These disagreements gave rise to several judicial and arbitral 
proceedings. Grand Hotels initiated arbitration proceedings in Cairo 
(apparently in conformity with the contractual arbitration clause), claiming 
that H&H had breached the contract between the parties and that the 
contract was thus terminated.181 For its part, H&H commenced two 
proceedings in the Egyptian courts: the first one involved a breach-of-
contract claim based on Grand Hotels’ refusal to accept H&H’s 
development plans and its alleged interference with the licensing process; 
 
 
176 See Wegen & Markert, supra note 17, at 282. 
177 H&H Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award 
(May 6, 2014), 
http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C720/DC9652_En.pdf; H&H 
Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Decision on Jurisdiction 
(June 5, 2012), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1012.pdf.  
178 H&H Enters., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 3. 
179 Id. ¶ 2. 
180 H&H Enters., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award, ¶ 371. 
181 H&H Enters., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 5. 
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the second one related to H&H’s alleged option to buy.182 
In the ICSID arbitration proceedings which H&H filed following its 
eviction from the resort, Egypt raised a number of jurisdictional 
objections, including an objection based on the FITR provision contained 
in the applicable treaty, the US-Egypt BIT. Taking the view that this 
objection was “closely related to the merits of the case,”183 the arbitral 
tribunal decided to deal with the respondent’s FITR objection in its 
decision on the merits.184 In its award, the arbitral tribunal rejected the 
application of the triple-identity test, noting that such a test was not 
expressly provided for in the treaty’s FITR clause,185 and that the 
application of this test “would defeat the purpose of Article VII of the US-
Egypt BIT (the FITR clause), which is to ensure that the same dispute is 
not litigated in different fora.”186 The arbitral tribunal explained that “what 
matter[ed] [was] the subject matter of the dispute,”187 expressly endorsing 
the fundamental basis test established in Pantechniki.188 
On the basis of this test, the arbitral tribunal compared the fundamental 
basis (or bases) of the claims brought before the Cairo arbitral tribunal and 
the Egyptian courts with the fundamental basis (or bases) of the various 
claims submitted to the ICSID tribunal (expropriation, fair and equitable 
treatment, and others).189 It focused on the specific conduct relied upon in 
these different sets of claims, observing that the local arbitration and court 
proceedings and the ICSID arbitration proceedings both centered on the 
alleged violation by Grand Hotels of the management and operation 
contract (a claim raised by way of defense in the Cairo arbitration 
proceedings) and the alleged refusal by Grand Hotels to honor the option 
to buy granted to the investor. The tribunal concluded that these claims 
shared the same fundamental basis and that the investor was thus 
precluded from submitting the relevant claims to an ICSID tribunal.190 
 
 
 
 
182 H&H Enters., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award, ¶ 374. 
183 H&H Enters., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 79.  
184 Id. 
185 H&H Enters., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award, ¶ 364. 
186 Id. ¶ 367. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. ¶ 368-70. 
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VI. EVALUATION OF FORMALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC APPROACHES FROM 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF TREATY INTERPRETATION 
A. Preliminary remarks 
The approaches followed in the decisions examined in Sections IV and 
V above can be evaluated both from an interpretive and from a normative 
perspective. From an interpretive perspective, the relevant question is 
whether the different tribunals have correctly interpreted the applicable 
FITR provisions. The normative perspective, on the other hand, focuses on 
whether the various approaches provide an adequate solution to the FITR 
problem, regardless of the actual wording of the different FITR clauses. 
This Section offers a basic assessment of the interpretive merits of 
formalistic and pragmatic approaches. 
Before undertaking such an assessment, it is necessary to clarify by 
reference to what rules of interpretation this assessment will be made. 
Given that FITR clauses are treaty provisions, the relevant rules of 
interpretation are those of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”)191 and other applicable rules of customary international law. Of 
particular relevance is the general rule contained in article 31(1) VCLT, 
which provides for a combination of literal, teleological, and contextual 
interpretation.192 The present evaluation of FITR rulings will emphasize 
literal interpretation, without addressing purpose and context. In fact, 
context does not appear to be of particular relevance for FITR 
determinations. As far as purpose (or intent) is concerned, it will be 
examined in the context of the functional analysis performed in Section 
VII. This is appropriate because of the significant overlap between the 
objective function of FITR provisions and the subjective aims pursued by 
treaty drafters when adopting such provisions. 
It is also important to bear in mind that, in practice, not all FITR 
clauses are drafted in the same language. As has been explained above, 
there are different categories of FITR provisions and the respective 
interpretive implications may vary accordingly. However, all FITR 
provisions share a common core, namely the requirement of sameness of 
the disputes concerned, and the preclusive effect that arises when this 
requirement is met. In light of this common core, it is possible to make 
 
 
191 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
192 VCLT, supra note 191, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose.”). 
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interpretive findings of general validity. These findings suggest that none 
of the existing approaches is (fully) convincing. 
B. Approach based on the distinction between treaty and contract 
claims 
From an interpretive perspective, the approach based on the distinction 
between treaty and contract claims is wholly inadequate. In fact, this 
approach does not actually seek to interpret FITR clauses. What it does is 
transpose a principle elaborated in relation to a different issue (the issue of 
whether a contractual forum-selection or arbitration clause deprives an 
investor-state arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction over treaty claims) to the 
FITR context. 
Such a transposition is of course not per se problematic or undesirable. 
However, the problem with this approach is that it only addresses 
situations where the investor brings a breach-of-contract claim in the local 
courts or before a contract-based arbitral tribunal and subsequently 
initiates investor-state arbitration proceedings. It does not deal with other 
possible scenarios, such as, for example, cases where the investor 
challenges an administrative decision in the local courts. In these cases, 
the distinction between treaty and contract claims is not helpful for the 
simple reason that there is no contract between the parties to the domestic 
proceedings. The scope of the distinction between contract and treaty 
claims is thus too narrow to deal with FITR issues adequately. 
C. Triple-identity test 
Similarly to the distinction between treaty and contract claims, the 
triple-identity test is not a convincing interpretive approach. Like its 
counterpart, it does not actually attempt to interpret the language of the 
relevant FITR clauses. Rather, as has been shown, it borrows an existing 
legal principle (lis pendens) and the applicable legal threshold and applies 
it to the FITR problem. And while such an approach may be justified in 
light of the functional similarity of the lis pendens rule and FITR 
provisions found in investment treaties,193 it nevertheless fully disregards 
the specific language employed in FITR clauses.  
In order to assess the triple-identity test from an interpretive 
perspective, it is thus necessary to examine whether, independently of any 
 
 
193 See infra Section VII. 
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transposition of the lis pendens principle, the wording of FITR clauses 
justifies the application of this test. In this respect, it must be observed that 
the triple-identity test finds some support in a literal interpretation of FITR 
provisions. As has already been explained, the crucial issue in the FITR 
analysis is the question of the sameness of the disputes concerned. It 
appears reasonable to answer this question by reference to the 
characteristic features of a dispute (parties, cause of action, relief 
requested) and to require identity of these features. Simply put, only 
disputes that share the same characteristic features can be considered as 
being the same. 
Under certain FITR provisions, a particularly compelling interpretive 
argument can be made in favor of one specific element of the triple-
identity test, namely the requirement of identity between the parties. This 
is so because, as has been explained above, a number of FITR clauses 
provide that an investor is prohibited from initiating investor-state 
arbitration proceedings where he, i.e., the investor, has previously brought 
the dispute before a different court or tribunal.194 In other words, the 
preclusive effect of FITR provisions is only produced if it is the investor 
himself who has initiated the earlier proceedings, and not a different legal 
entity (even if it is owned or controlled by the investor).  
D. Pragmatic approach 
While, as has been explained above, it is sensible to hold that two 
disputes are only the same if the relevant parties, causes of action, and 
relief sought are identical, it may be equally reasonable to adopt a less 
strict interpretation of the sameness requirement. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the concept of dispute should be distinguished from the related 
notion of claim, an argument that notably finds support in the definition of 
the term “dispute” provided in Black’s Law Dictionary.195 As has already 
been mentioned, this definition expressly distinguishes between disputes 
in a broad sense (conflicts or controversies) and the lawsuits to which such 
disputes may give rise.196 Accordingly, one could take the view that one 
and the same dispute can give rise to more than one claim which can be 
brought before more than one court or arbitral tribunal on the basis of 
more than one legal rule or standard. 
The pragmatic approach also finds support in the interpretive principle 
 
 
194 See, e.g., the FITR provisions referred to in endnotes 24 and 29. 
195 Dispute, supra note 53. 
196 See supra Section III.B. 
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of effectiveness (or effet utile).197 The importance of this principle in this 
particular context has notably been emphasized by Wegen and Markert.198 
The basic consideration is that the application of the triple-identity test 
would make it near to impossible for FITR provisions to apply. This 
argument is based on the observation that (1) investor-state arbitration 
proceedings are almost always based on treaty provisions (i.e., they 
generally involve allegations of treaty breaches) and that (2) domestic 
court or contractual arbitration proceedings are, in the vast majority of 
cases, based on domestic law (or a contract governed by domestic law). 
VII. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE FITR 
A. The functions of FITR provisions 
Unsurprisingly, FITR provisions do not contain any indications as to 
the function (or functions) they are intended to serve. It is perhaps more 
surprising that a discussion of this function (or these functions) is also 
almost entirely absent from the relevant arbitral case law. This confirms 
the observation made above that most arbitral tribunals ruling on FITR-
based jurisdictional objections (and especially those that apply a 
formalistic approach) do not actually interpret the relevant clauses, but 
merely apply rules or tests established in earlier decisions. 
It is not difficult, however, to determine the actual role played by FITR 
clauses. As has been observed by the ICSID tribunal in H&H v. Egypt, the 
purpose of a FITR provision is “to ensure that the same dispute is not 
litigated before different fora,”199 i.e., to avoid what is generally referred 
to as “parallel proceedings.” Although the expression “parallel 
proceedings” is not a term of art, it can be regarded as covering two types 
of situations: those in which proceedings in the same matter are pending 
before a different court or tribunal and those in which this court or tribunal 
has already decided the dispute. 
The finding that FITR clauses aim to avoid parallel proceedings is, in 
and of itself, not helpful in answering the question of when two disputes 
 
 
197 For a discussion of the meaning and scope of the principle of effectiveness, see RICHARD K. 
GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 66-68 (2d ed. 2015). 
198 Wegen & Markert, supra note 17, at 280 (noting that “[i]f one made the identity of the legal 
bases of the claim the main criterion, a fork-in-the-road clause would often not be afforded an effective 
scope”).  
199 H&H Enters. Invs., Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/15, Award, ¶ 
367 (May 6, 2014), 
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can be considered as identical. In order to answer this question, it is 
necessary to determine what the particular detrimental effects of parallel 
proceedings are that FITR provisions seek to prevent. As has been pointed 
out in scholarly contributions, one problem of parallel proceedings is the 
unfair advantage conferred upon claimants in such proceedings.200  In fact, 
the claimant is given not one, but two or more opportunities (or “shots”) to 
prevail in one and the same lawsuit. The respondent on the other hand will 
have to prevail in both (or more) proceedings in order to escape liability. 
Hence, parallel proceedings unduly favor the claimant. 
The second problem of parallel proceedings is that they create a risk of 
overcompensation of the claimant (assuming that no other legal tool is 
available to avoid such overcompensation). If, for example, in the 
Pantechniki v. Albania case discussed above Pantechniki had been 
awarded the requested compensation in the domestic courts and had 
subsequently also prevailed in the ICSID arbitration proceedings, it would 
have been overcompensated for the loss sustained. In fact, it would have 
been compensated twice for the same loss (the loss incurred in connection 
with the destruction of its work site). 
A third undesirable effect of parallel proceedings is that they 
undermine the efficient, i.e., expeditious and cost-effective, resolution of 
investment disputes. It is not difficult to understand that efficiency 
requires that one and the same dispute be heard by one single court or 
tribunal. Indeed, where dispute resolution is fragmented and where several 
courts or tribunals hear one single dispute (or different aspects of the same 
dispute), additional costs are created for the parties to the dispute and a 
delaying effect may also result on all proceedings.201 
The fourth and last concern raised by parallel proceedings is that they 
may lead to conflicting decisions, i.e., different decisions on identical legal 
issues. Such lack of decisional harmony threatens an orderly resolution of 
disputes and may be a source of complications in the context of the 
enforcement of the decisions rendered. The need to avoid conflicting 
decisions has been expressly recognized in connection with the lis pendens 
rule contained in the Brussels I Regulation.202 It has also been emphasized 
 
 
200 See, e.g., Bernardo M. Cremades & Ignacio Madalena, Parallel Proceedings in International 
Arbitration, 24 ARB. INT’L 507, 508 (2008) (noting that claimants initiate parallel proceedings in order 
to “seek the widest legal protection or to increase their chances of success”); Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Abuse of Process in International Arbitration, 32 ICSID REV. 1, 6 (2017) (referring to parallel 
proceedings as an abusive practice aimed at maximizing a claimant’s chances of success). 
201 See Gaillard, supra note 200, at 7 (observing that the introduction of parallel proceedings 
“fragments the parties’ disputes and leads to excessive costs and delays”). 
202 Brussels I Regulation, supra note 94, Preamble recital no. 21 (referring to the need to 
“minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss2/7
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by academic writers.203 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that the basic function of 
FITR clauses is to prevent the various detrimental effects of parallel 
proceedings, namely (a) the conferral of an undue advantage upon the 
claimant; (b) the risk of overcompensation of the claimant; (c) 
inefficiency; and (d) the risk of conflicting decisions. On the basis of this 
conclusion, it is possible to determine the basic contours of a suitable 
FITR rule and to evaluate, this time from a normative perspective, the 
existing formalistic and pragmatic approaches. 
B. Conclusions based on functional analysis 
Functional analysis of the FITR is not without limitations. One such 
limitation is that some of the factors outlined above are not particularly 
helpful in determining a specific FITR rule. The need to avoid granting 
claimants an unfair advantage, for example, raises the question of when 
such an undue advantage actually arises. Is it, generally speaking, unfair 
for the claimant to have two opportunities to obtain the same relief? Or is 
it only unfair to grant the claimant two such opportunities on the same 
legal basis? Under the first proposition, the FITR rule could apply even 
where the legal bases relied upon are different. Under the second 
approach, identity of legal bases would be required for the FITR clause to 
apply. In this author’s opinion, there is no compelling argument in favor of 
one solution over the other. Essentially, the question is whether, from a 
procedural point of view, the legal protections provided for in investment 
treaties are alternative to the rights investors enjoy under domestic law, or 
whether, to the contrary, these protections supplement the domestic law 
rights.  
Efficiency of the dispute resolution process is another factor that does 
not assist in designing a specific FITR rule. As has been explained, 
efficiency requires that one single dispute be heard by one single court or 
tribunal. But what exactly does this mean? Does inefficiency only arise 
where two claims based on the same legal basis (and thus raising identical 
legal issues) are brought before two separate courts or tribunals? Or is it 
already inefficient if two claims based on the same factual background and 
pursuing the same relief are submitted to different courts or tribunals, 
regardless of the relevant legal bases? Again, it is very difficult to choose 
 
 
not be given in different Member States”). 
203 See, e.g., Cremades & Madalena, supra note 200, at 507 (mentioning the “risk of conflicting 
decisions and awards”).  
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between these competing views. 
Another limitation of functional analysis is that the function(s) 
performed by FITR clauses may vary depending on the availability of 
other legal rules performing the same or similar functions. Where, for 
example, the defense of lis pendens is available, there may be no need to 
rely on a treaty’s FITR provision in order to prevent resubmission of an 
already pending investment dispute. Likewise, where the principle of res 
judicata204 is applicable, there may be no need to invoke a treaty’s FITR 
clause to prevent the resubmission of an investment dispute that has 
already been decided by another court or tribunal.  
Subject to these limitations, three observations can be made. First, the 
avoidance of the risk of overcompensation of claimants militates in favor 
of a flexible approach to the requirement of identity of the parties, with 
regard to both claimants and respondents. If, for example, a company 
owned by the investor receives compensation for the losses caused by an 
unlawfully imposed tax measure, compensation of the investor himself in 
separate proceedings would lead to overcompensation. This is so because 
the investor no longer suffers any loss where the immediately injured party 
(the investor’s subsidiary) is already indemnified. Similarly, where the 
investor brings separate claims against the host state and a separate state-
owned entity or territorial subdivision to obtain reparation for the same 
loss, the rendering of favorable decisions in the two distinct proceedings 
would also lead to him being overcompensated. 
Second, prevention of the risk of overcompensation highlights the 
importance of the relief requested. In fact, where the nature of the relief 
requested is dissimilar (for example, an annulment of a particular measure 
by the competent administrative court versus a request for compensation 
for the loss suffered as a result of the application of the said measure), no 
risk of overcompensation exists. Where the nature of the relief sought is 
the same and relates to the same material facts or conduct attributable to 
the state (for example, separate requests for compensation for (1) breach of 
contract, and (2) breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
contained in the applicable treaty resulting from, or in connection with, the 
alleged breach of contract), favorable decisions may lead to 
overcompensation. 
Third, the need to avoid conflicting decisions requires that one seek to 
prevent identical issues being decided by more than one court or tribunal. 
 
 
204 Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (“[a]n affirmative defense barring 
the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim, or any other claim arising from the 
same transaction or series of transactions and that could have been – but was not – raised in the first 
suit”).  
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Since the violation of a treaty standard and of domestic law or of a 
contract governed by domestic law are different legal issues, the FITR 
would not, in principle, need to be applied in cases where the legal bases 
relied upon differ. However, not applying the FITR in these situations 
would compromise the ability of FITR clauses to avoid overcompensation 
of claimants. The legal bases invoked in the different proceedings should 
thus not be relevant for the purposes of the operation of FITR provisions. 
The three observations made above are not only helpful for designing a 
meaningful FITR rule; they also allow a normative assessment of existing 
approaches to the FITR problem. More specifically, they suggest that the 
formalistic approaches are not suitable. The approaches based on the 
distinction between treaty and contract claims are not appropriate because, 
as has been explained, the criterion pertaining to the legal bases of the 
claims raised in the different proceedings should not be relevant. As 
regards the triple-identity rule, neither the strict requirement of party 
identity, nor the requirement of identity of the legal bases relied upon are 
suitable. 
As far as the pragmatic fundamental-basis test is concerned, functional 
analysis shows that this approach rightly rejects the requirements of strict 
identity of the parties and of the relevant legal bases, which are at the core 
of the formalistic approaches. However, it also highlights that this 
approach fails to acknowledge the relevance of the relief requested in the 
proceedings concerned. In addition, as has already been explained, the 
fundamental basis test is simply too vague to ensure legal certainty. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
This article has explored arbitral case law dealing with FITR-based 
jurisdictional objections. It has shown that two formalistic approaches (the 
distinction between treaty and contract claims and the triple-identity test) 
co-exist with the pragmatic fundamental-basis test. This article has 
evaluated these contrasting approaches, both from an interpretive and from 
a normative perspective. On the basis of a functional analysis, suggestions 
have been made as to how and when a suitable FITR provision should 
operate. As such, the findings of this contribution may offer useful insights 
to both treaty interpreters and drafters. 
Building upon the analysis contained in this article, it may be 
interesting to examine the relevance of FITR provisions in current treaty 
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practice. Judging notably from the recent U.K.,205 German,206 and U.S.207 
Model BITs, it would appear that FITR clauses (at least, express ones) are 
not standard treaty terms. While the U.K. and the German Model BITs 
contain clauses that could be considered as implied FITR provisions,208 
the U.S. Model BIT does not contain any FITR clause. Instead, it 
addresses the problems caused by parallel proceedings through a waiver 
provision under which the claimant must waive its right to initiate or 
continue proceedings in the host state’s courts pertaining to the same 
measure or measures.209 
Also, as is easily understood, the analysis contained in this article has 
implications beyond the scope of the FITR issue. Indeed, the critical 
evaluation of the formalistic distinction between treaty and contract claims 
made in relation to the FITR issue can of course be transposed to the other 
context in which this distinction is currently applied: the question of 
whether a contractual forum-selection or arbitration clause contained in an 
investment contract deprives an investor-state arbitral tribunal of its 
jurisdiction over treaty breaches (allegedly) arising in connection with the 
performance of the investment contract. It may thus be in order to reflect 
on whether the current arbitral approach to this question is fully 
satisfactory.210 
 
 
205 UNCTAD, U.K. DRAFT MODEL TEXT FOR THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF 
INVESTMENTS [hereinafter U.K. MODEL BIT], 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2847.  
206 UNCTAD, GERMAN MODEL TREATY-2008 [hereinafter GERMAN MODEL BIT], 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2865.  
207 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY [hereinafter U.S. 
MODEL BIT], https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf.  
208 See U.K. MODEL BIT, supra note 205, art. 8(2) (offering investors several arbitration options 
(ICSID, ICC, UNCITRAL)); GERMAN MODEL BIT, supra note 206, art. 10(2) (offering investors a 
choice between several arbitration options (ICSID, UNCITRAL, ICC, LCIA) and contractually-agreed 
forms of dispute resolution). 
209 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 207, art. 26(2)(b).  
210 The two classical arguments relied upon by arbitral tribunals rejecting jurisdictional 
challenges based on contractual forum-selection or arbitration clauses are that (1) treaties and contracts 
belong to separate legal orders and are fully effective within those legal orders, and (2) contractual 
forum-selection or arbitration clauses do not amount to a waiver of the investor’s right to initiate 
treaty-based investor-state arbitration proceedings. Neither of these justifications is particularly 
compelling.  
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